The Battle of Britain

In May 1940 after the fall of France, Hitler firmly believed that Britain, cut off from mainland Europe after the retreat from Dunkirk, would be ready to sue for peace if given enough time and incentive. He deduced that with Britain out of the war, America would come to terms with the new order as it could hope to gain no foothold in Europe without paying a terrible price. This would enable Germany to concentrate on what had always been considered the main threat, Russia.

By 1939 air warfare was still a comparatively new concept and had only been in existence for 25 years. Much of the philosophy, strategy and tactics had been developed during W.W.I. Perhaps the greatest influence had been by General Giulio Douhet, where the concept that “….the bomber will always get through” was first adopted. It was firmly believed that bombing attacks alone would win future wars. This was to have a profound effect on the development of air forces all over the world with strong support for these theories from Trenchard, Goering and Mitchell. The result, together with a much greater emphasis on training, was a greater concentration on a bombing force than on fighter aircraft development. Before the outbreak of WWII the theory gained credence for British, German, Italian and Japanese exponents, but always with an unopposed bomber force attacking undefended targets. It was thought that there could be no effective defense against this. It seems incredible, but little consideration had been given to the need for fighter escorts, night bombing or bombing through cloud for which additional communications, navigational and sighting equipment would be needed.

A further consideration was that the slaughter of WWI had led to years of minimal defense spending throughout Europe, Germany being the major exception. This left most countries unprepared for the aggressive stance adopted by Germany under Hitler. Appeasement was the only realistic policy until such time as the deficit could be made up.

Formed from the amalgamation of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service on April 1st 1918, the RAF was the most junior member of the Armed Forces and was treated as such. Until 1934 it commanded only 17% of the Defense Budget but spent much of the money on buildings and refurbishment, not on aircraft. The F2b Bristol Fighter developed in 1916 remained in RAF service until 1927. Even when the RAF share of the Defence Budget rose to 40% in 1936 the spending priorities remained unaltered. There was strong opposition to fighter development, particularly that of stressed metal monoplanes and greater emphasis was placed on bomber development, in common with the rest of Europe.

This situation continued until 1937 when Sir Thomas Inskip became Minister for Co-ordinated Defense. He reasoned that defense against German bombers was, after all, possible if the new Hurricanes and Spitfires were used in combination with the recently developed Radio Direction Finding equipment, and that the overall cost would be less than that of the continued enlargement of a strategic bombing force. This change in policy, inspired for economic reasons, was promulgated by the government to the furious objections of the Air Marshals. Lord Trenchard stated that “…..it might well cost us the war.”

Under the Treaty of Versailles Germany was not permitted an air force. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe was developed in secret under the direction of Erhard Milch and Herman Goering . This incorporated the glider clubs of the NSFK (Nationalsozialist Flieger Korps), while pilot and navigational instruction was conducted by Lufthansa on a rotation scheme. The existence of the Luftwaffe was made official in early 1935 with the tacit and helpless acknowledgement of the Allies. The application by Germany to glider design and aerodynamics in this period led to the development of aircraft that were significantly superior to those of the allied powers. It was the later deployment and role that limited their use.

All along the eastern and southern coasts of Britain were linked radar stations which comprised Chain Home Low. This system, designed by Robert Watson-Watt, had been fortuitously installed in 1939 under the direction of Dowding before he became head of Fighter Command. As incoming enemy aircraft were located and identified, individual radar stations telephoned their reports to Fighter Command HQ where they were collated and cross referenced with Observer Corps reports. Contacts were plotted together with approximate numbers, direction, and to a certain extent, altitude. The information was passed on to Group and Sector Operations Rooms for action. Operations Rooms also had “Tote Boards” which indicated the immediate status of readiness for each squadron within a Group. It was in this way that fighters could be scrambled and vectored onto the incoming bomber stream in proportion to the strength of the attack and the estimated likely target

The Hurricane did the work, the Spitfire took the glory. There were more squadrons equipped with the former for the simple reason they were easier and cheaper to produce. Though a little slower and inferior at high altitude, they were an excellent gun platform. The Order of Battle of July 1940 for 11, 12 and 13 Groups shows that of the 58 operational squadrons 29 were equipped with Hurricanes, 19 with Spitfires, 8 with Blenheims and 2 with Defiants.

The impression that this battle was waged against the Luftwaffe exclusively by RAF Fighter Command with Spitfires as the predominant aircraft and these flown exclusively by British pilots is quite wrong and not a fitting tribute to all those who took part in the greatest air battle in history. What of Bomber Command, the “Big Wing” controversy and Chain Home? These too were vital components that popular history has tended to overlook.

Bibliography

• Nostbakken, Faith. Understanding Macbeth. Westport, CT; Greenwood Press, 1997.
• Scott, Mark W. Shakespeare for Students. Detroit, MI; Gale Research Inc., 1992.
• Shakespeare, William. Macbeth. Cambridge, England: Oxford University Press, 1977