The Battle of Vella Gulf
On the night of 6 August 1943 between the islands of Valle Lavella and Kolombangara, six Navy destroyers – the Dunlap DD 394 , Craven DD 392 , Maury DD 401 , Lang DD 399 , Stertt DD 407, and Stack DD 406 – changed the tactical role of destroyers forever. These ship, in the battle of Vella Gulf, were the first destroyers allowed to operate independent during a campaign.
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote “He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.” The victory at Vella Gulf proved this theory that, an inferior force with innovative leaders, effective weapony, and the element of surprise can make a difference in a battle.
Vella Gulf was important because for the first time, American destroyers demonstrated they could do more than just scouting and carrying passengers or cargo. The destroyers were able to successfully employ innovative maneuvers and firing tactics.
On the 5th of August, the Commander of the Third Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, received reports of a Tokyo Express movement. With the bulk of his cruisers damaged, he was short a ready unit. The only available force was a pure destroyer strike force. Wilkinson assigned Commodore Mossbrugger six destroyers with the go ahead to use this unit as he saw fit.
Mossbrugger’s plan was to strike first using his primary weapon the torpedoes, and then with 40mm guns. Mossbrugger, who served under Commodore Burke, used his T doctrine tactic. He figured that since destroyers can operate in two groups, they could catch the enemy in crossfire. This doctrine required each ship to know what the other would do in any given circumstance.
Mossbrugger had the units maneuver behind the black backdrop of the Kolombangara islands to help hide their ships. The torpedoes were armed with powerful warheads and shields were employed to hide the telltale flash when the torpedoes were discharged. The executive officer of the Maury, who believed that the torpedoes were running too deep, requested all eight torpedoes be set to run at five feet. By the time the Japanese column spotted the Americans the torpedoes were about a minute away from their targets.
The victory at Vella Gulf was made possible by having a plan and a doctrine. Other factors were equally important. The Navy had placed the best men like Moosbrugger in positions of leadership. Mossbrugger delegated authority to his officers, like the Executive Officer of the Maury, who had seen enough war to sense the flaws in their weapons and ways to offset these flaws. Technology also helped. Faulty torpedo detonators were out, flashless powder, flash hiders, and more powerful warheads were in. The Navy used the element of surprise by hiding in the dark shores and cornering the Japanese with torpedos and gunfire. I wonder if the Japanese lookouts had seen the Americans even a minute earlier, would the results have been the same. There are no guarantees in war, but the Navy had everything in their favor and thus gained the greatest victory of the campaign. They finally taught the Japanese to respect American torpedoes.
Books on The Battle of Vella Gulf

South Pacific Destroyer: The Battle for the Solomons from Savo Island to Vella Gulf
South Pacific Destroyer is one of the best histories of the Solomon Islands Campaign and Pacific Destroyer Operations I have read. Russell Crenshaw’s book starts off with the USS Maury alongside the crippled CA New Orleans moored against Florida Island. He walks us through the living and working compartments of the Maury, from the crews head to the bridge letting us feel the life of each compartment in the ship. By the end of the first 10 pages you have a feel for Destroyer life, and the conversations and concerns of the officers and crew.
From there the author walks us through the tactical situations faced by the Maury and other destroyers, and covers each major and most minor actions in the Guadalcanal Navel Campaign. Cruiser and destroyer movements and actions in each battle are explained from the viewpoint of the participants, so you have a combination of the actions of the battle along with the personal memories. Some books focus more on one or the other, but this one achieves what I thought was a very nice balance.
At the end of the book tables are included that show actual results achieved in the actions (ships hit, with major or minor damage) the contrast between actual damage to the Japanese ships vs. what had been observed is striking! There is also a discussion of the torpedo problems in the US Fleet, and one regarding the effectiveness of some of our guns. Very enlightening.
While much of the detailed tactical information presented here is available elsewhere, combined with the personal and human information contained an outstanding reading experience is provided!



